And we're carrying on with concerns of mentally disabled and thieving individuals working in religious institution (it's not just churches anymore) food service operations - but it does apply to their thrift stores or anywhere else cash may be handled.
Here's a down and dirty look at cash controls and that includes any monetary instrument including checks, store script/gift certificates, and so on.
In any cash management system there are at least two places from which to reconcile your activities - when the cash is received and when it gets into your account. In some cases the 'receiving' part is a little more vague and uncontrolled - like offering plates - but for now we'll stick to this assumption. The problem isn't whether the money makes it from point A (receiving the money) to point B (arrival in the account), but what happens to it in between. The real problem is how the funds are transferred between parties at different points in the process. (If you're skilled with flowcharts then they can be very handy at this point.) In other words, it's the transfers between parties and the processing done between transfers that create the problem. Common sense, you say? Maybe so, but it's amazing how often a very simple procedure could have prevented an enormous loss - and the accompanying embarrassment, loss of face, distrust, anger, and the rest that comes from a betrayal!
In short, each transfer of cash should include the active participation of two persons. Each party is then responsible for verifying what is transferred. Documenting this is also useful for many reasons and the documentation typically includes the signatures of both parties (date and time, etc.). If the receiving party is unable to verify the total in the presence of the transmitting party then there should be two persons in the receiving party that verify it. This is based on an assumption (sometimes incorrectly - but that's another discussion) that it's harder for two persons to collude on a crime than for one person to commit it alone... So then if we have a loss we are able to see that the proper funds are transferred from party to party until an incorrect amount of funds are transferred. So easy - when done properly - and having clear (and enforced) procedures for transfers goes a long way to preventing losses. Why is prevention better? Especially here? First, proving larceny or embezzlement often requires an admission by the thief - which may not be difficult for an experienced interviewer/interrogator (see Chris' article here, and this website, and this website for more information on interviews) but what house of worship wants to employ these methods? (I think they all should because it's effective and, if done properly, helps the organization make a meaningful loss recovery and aids the thief because they get the feeling of a clear conscience - they don't call it a confession for nothing) Also law enforcement is generally too busy to get deeply involved in an internal loss - it's a property crime, time consuming, and is many times not seen as "real crime," and it costs money to go through an investigation. That means more loss! So prevention, prevention, prevention.
The next concern is what is done between transfers - the processing. Whatever processing that should be done to funds including counting, recording, packaging, and deposit preparation should have clear (and enforced) procedures. It is always preferable that any handling of funds is done under "dual control." This involves two (dual) people that verify each other's work to ensure accuracy. The purpose of dual control is to avoid errors; however a byproduct is an significant decrease in opportunities for theft. Their activities should also be documented - preferably with their signatures.
That is the short form on cash control... I didn't mention issues concerning the verification that it was received in the first place but we can save that for another time. This opens a whole other can of worms since you must now determine whether items were accounted for at the point of sale/transfer and so on... Enough for now.
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